Over the decades, numerous conspiracy theories have surfaced regarding the loss of the nuclear attack submarine USS Scorpion (SSN-589) on May 22nd, 1968.
These ridiculous theories range from an undersea battle with an Echo II class submarine (which did not have the capability to detect a Skipjack class sub out past a few thousand yards), or the absurd conspiracy theory  of a super secret KGB team flying a Ka-25 “Hormone” ASW helicopter to sink the boat. Another equally absurd and highly improbably conspiracy theory is that Scorpion was sunk in retaliation for the loss of the Soviet sub K-129 (Golf II), which exploded and sank in March 1968. It gets even more preposterous with claims that K-129 was a “rogue” submarine, attempting to fire SLBM’s on Hawaii.
The facts from declassified documents, films, and interviews with those who have viewed the Scorpion’s wreckage clearly show the submarine imploded at depth after the initial internal casualty. There is no evidence of a torpedo strike (which would have been obvious and utterly devastating to the sub), nor is there any evidence of fire in the forward torpedo room.
The physical and acoustic evidence points toward a hydrogen gas explosion from the TLX-53-A batteries, and implosion at depth. Retired USN ONI analyst Bruce Rule covers this material in great detail. While there was possibly another factor involved in the loss of the sub (also including hydrogen), the fact remains that the boat possibly surfaced and at least one crew member made an escape attempt. We will provide more details in our third volume on nuclear weapons accidents, which we hope to release by the end of 2019.

Our first two books cover the loss of the USS Scorpion, to including excerpts from declassified documents and the official USN Court of Inquiry and subsequent analysis.

By M.H. Maggelet

There appears to be a lot of hand wringing by those concerned about nuclear weapons lost at sea (or on land). In the case of the former, many of the weapons were intentionally jettisoned during in-flight emergencies, and did not contain a plutonium nuclear capsule. These were early “open pit” nuclear bombs that required a weaponeer to manually insert the capsule into the weapon prior to a combat drop.

In many instances, a training capsule made of lead was installed in the weapon or in the “birdcage” storage container.  On some types of weapons, such as the Mark 15 Mod 0 thermonuclear bomb jettisoned off Tybee, Georgia, no plutonium capsule was loaded on the automatic in-flight insertion mechanism (the B-47 was carrying a lead training capsule in a birdcage in the cockpit, as shown by custody documents). Additionally, AEC and armed services regulations dictated that AIFI weapons with a plutonium capsule were to sit ground alert only; they were not flown with a cap on the AIFI due to safety concerns. As such, there is zero chance of a nuclear detonation from the Tybee weapon since it did not contain a plutonium capsule in the primary.
As for sealed pit weapons, that is, weapons with a capsule or thin shell of nuclear material sealed within the high explosive sphere, they are subject to the debilitating effects of seawater. In such cases, the nuclear materials will eventually corrode and dissolve, leading to very localized plutonium contamination (as in the case of the two nuclear torpedoes on the USS Scorpion which sank in May 1968, and the Soviet K-278 “Komsomolets” submarine which sank off Bear Island, Norway in April 1989). These weapons do not present a nuclear detonation hazard.

More declassified details on lost nuclear weapons, safety features, and some environmental concerns are included in the books by myself and James C. Oskins, available through Amazon.com, Barnes and Noble, and other book sellers.

“Broken Arrow, The Declassified History of US Nuclear Weapons Accidents” by Michael H. Maggelet and James C. Oskins. ISBN-10-978-1435703612, or ISBN-13-978-1435703612.

“Broken Arrow, Volume II- A Disclosure of Significant US, Soviet, and British Nuclear Weapons Incidents and Accidents, 1945-2008” by Michael H. Maggelet and James C. Oskins. ISBN-10-0557655935, or ISBN-13-978-0557655939.

by M. H. Maggelet

Time and again we read stories about Soviet officers performing their internationalist and progressive duties, and in the face of overwhelming imperialist hegemony and provocation, they manage to save the world from a nuclear holocaust and restore collective peace and international justice, etc. That’s what the Left wing press would have us believe. As we used to say in the military, it’s pure “Bravo Sierra”.

As with other world nuclear forces, a single individual cannot authorize the launch of a nuclear weapon. It takes many individuals, ranging from security forces to authentication codes, to access nuclear weapons or to initiate the nuclear release process of a combat ready nuclear weapon system.

Such was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Soviet submarine B-59 (Project 641, NATO Foxtrot class) was detected by US anti-submarine forces and eventually surfaced after her batteries ran down. Just prior to surfacing, conditions inside the sub were extremely difficult with equipment breakdowns, and temperatures reaching 140 degrees Fahrenheit.

Several senior officers lost their bearing and argued about using a nuclear torpedo on board the sub (likely a 53-58 T-5 with RDS-9 warhead, 3 or 9 kilotons) on circling US destroyers. One Soviet officer aboard B-59, Vadim Orlov, recorded the incident, and notes Captain Savitsky angrily ordered the assembly of the torpedo to combat readiness, which takes a minimum of three individuals (team chief, and at least two team members to perform mechanical and final assembly tasks).  Additionally, a KGB officer (and communist party representative) were on board, having the final word on preparing nuclear weapons for launch.

There were at least two versions of the RDS-9 warhead for the T-5, one mod with an internal neutron initiator that required extra steps for installation into the physics package, and a “sealed pit” version. Additionally, a nuclear armed torpedo would also have to be loaded into the tube, another time consuming task with a 24 foot long, 4400 pound weapon.

The story has been skewed by many in the media and the Left wing press, which  continually ignore the facts regarding the incident.  Orlov writes that after several moments, cooler heads prevailed and Second Captain V.A. Arkhipov and Deputy Political Officer I. S. Maslennnikov persuaded the captain to surface.

The story doesn’t end there of course, as some anti-nuclear activists have promoted a Soviet officer named Stanlislav Petrov with another glorious internationalist task of “saving the world” in 1983. Lt. Col Petrov was a duty officer in charge of an air defence (PVO-Strany) command center, which was alerted by orbiting Molniya early warning satellites of a missile launch towards the Soviet Union. Petrov ignored the indications, which were later proven erroneous. However, once the Left wing press learned of the incident after 1998, he was showered with awards from activist groups.

A statement released by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN noted that multiple sources are used to confirm an attack- “Under no circumstances a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made or even considered in the Soviet Union or in the United States on the basis of data from a single source or a system. For this to happen, a confirmation is necessary from several systems: ground based radars, early warning satellites, intelligence reports, etc.”

by Michael H. Maggelet

A recent online article by the “Atomic Heritage Foundation” entitled “Broken Arrow Accidents” contains numerous errors about nuclear weapons accidents and continues to perpetuate a number of myths. While tackling each statement from the article would be time consuming, I’ve included just one for the time being. Look for a future article on this blog detailing the misstatements and disinformation from the AHF “Broken Arrow Accidents” article.

The piece mentions the May 27th, 1957 Broken Arrow at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico and reads in part “The incident was revealed to the public for the first time in the 1980s, after AHF Board member Robert S. Norris, then a research associate for the Natural Resources Defense Council, remarked that the Mark 17 ‘is possibly the most powerful bomb we ever made’ “. This statement is false, and given the amount of declassified material in the public domain over the decades, such disinformation highlights the need for fact checking.  It should be noted that my co-author James Oskins, then a U.S. Air Force nuclear specialist (capsules) at Biggs AFB, Texas, did the prep for shipment on that weapon. The bomb did not contain a plutonium capsule as a standard safety precaution, and it was stored separately in the aircraft in a “birdcage” (storage container).

Mark 17 thermonuclear bomb, fielded from 1954 to 1957, with an approximate yield of 11 megatons (source- DOE Historical Films, photo- National Museum of the U.S. Air Force) 

The accident, not incident, was discussed in the local press and national media at the time, and officially disclosed in the 1977 DOD “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving US Nuclear Weapons”.

The Mark 17 was the largest nuclear bomb fielded by the US, however its yield was certainly not the highest ever produced for the stockpile. A review of declassified films from DOE Historical Films, which are readily available, clearly shows a Mark 17 casing during proof tests, and it certainly was not the highest yield weapon in the inventory (much less the test series). Other weapons tested during the atmospheric test program in the mid ’50’s, not to mention declassified documents, show proof tests of significantly higher yields (not even approaching the 19, 20, 21, 24, and 50 megaton shots of the USSR).

In 1962, the US revealed we had a weapon in stockpile with a yield of about 25 megatons (Restricted Data Declassification Decision 8, p. 95). The Mark 17 was retired in 1957.

Reposted from 27 September 2012

July 27, 1956/B-47/Overseas Base

The July 27th, 1956 crash of a B-47 into a storage igloo at RAF Lakenheath continues to be the source of disinformation (along with several other Broken Arrows we will discuss in the future). One of the most common myths is that the weapons, if they had detonated, would have “turned southeast England into a desert”. Well, not quite.

The three Mark 6 bombs were in storage, and therefore no nuclear capsules were installed, nor stored in the building (the nuclear capsule was manually installed in the Mk 6, and only when airborne and just prior to strike) . Each Mk 6 did contain at least 5,000 pounds of high explosives, and depleted uranium. Even if the weapons detonated due to fire, there would not have been a nuclear reaction (U-238 is not fissionable through high explosive compression or fire).

The former Atomic Energy Commission site at Medina, Texas is a prime example of such an accident. On November 13th, 1963, a forklift driver accidentally scraped a load of weapon components which subsequently caught fire. The resulting detonation of 123,000 pounds of HE vaporized the storage igloo and disassembled weapon components. No fatalities resulted, and the area around the Medina complex, Lackland Air Force Base, and San Antonio, Texas are not radioactive wastelands.

Details on the 36 known Broken Arrows can be read in “Broken Arrow, The Declassified History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents” by Michael H. Maggelet and James C. Oskins (ISBN 978-1-4357-0361-20). Our book contains copies of declassified accident reports, explosive ordnance disposal reports, and photos and drawings of accident scenes. Our books are available through Amazon.com, Books A Million, Barnes & Noble, and other fine booksellers.

About the authors-
Michael H. Maggelet is a U.S. Air Force retiree and was a Nuclear Weapons Specialist and Team Chief from December 1980 to June 1995. He had assignments with the 509th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, Pease AFB, New Hampshire, 380th MMS, Plattsburgh AFB, New York, in Rheinland Pfalz, Germany, and with the 28th Maintenance Squadron at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. During his time in service Mike worked on the B43, B57, several mods of the B61, the B83, and the AGM-69A Short Range Attack Missile.

James C. Oskins is a U.S. Air Force retiree, and was a Nuclear Specialist, a Nuclear Weapons Arming and Fusing Technician, a Nuclear Weapons Technician, and Team Chief from May 1955 to June 1975. He had assignments with the 35th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS), Biggs AFB, Texas, 702nd Strategic Missile Wing, Presque Isle AFB, Maine, 11th MMS RAF Upper Heyford, England, 28th MMS Carswell AFB, Texas, 381st Strategic Missile Wing, McConnell AFB, Kansas, and 320th MMS RAF Upper Heyford, England, and 3096th Aviation Depot Squadron, Nellis AFB, Nevada. During these assignment Jim worked on the Mark 6, Mk 15, Mk 17, Mk 21, W39, Mk 15 Mod 2, Mk 28, B53, W53, B57, and B61.

  This WordPress Blog will become the new home of the Maggelet-Oskins Broken Arrow blog, since Google is closing down their blog sites starting April 2019. We will archive and post the old material to this site.
  We have tons more declassified material to present, but unfortunately real world events take priority over research and writing. There are several more online articles to refute, and it will be, and has always been, our mission to present the facts in the face of overwhelming disinformation and outright fabrications by media “experts” regarding nuclear weapons, accidents and incidents, and the history surrounding their development and deployment.

Michael H. Maggelet
6 March 2019